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prominent to neglect stocks, but not vice versa. These findings also validate models of specialized
information intermediaries in stock markets assisting the information capitalization process.
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1.  Introduction  
In his American Finance Association presidential address, Merton (1987, p. 486) points 
out that “recognition of the different speeds of information diffusion is particularly 
important in empirical research, where the growth in sophisticated and sensitive 
techniques to test ever more refined financial behavior patterns severely strains the 
simple information structure of our asset pricing models.”  Merton goes on to develop a 
model of investors confining their attention, and money, to a subset of “high profile” 
stocks about which they have readily accessible information, potentially leaving other 
“neglected” stocks mispriced. Using analyst following to identify high profile firms, we 
show that investors use the information about these firms to help value related 
“neglected” stocks.   
  It is well established that informed risk arbitrage generates stock price movements 
and profit-maximizing arbitrageurs presumably pay for additional information until their 
expected revenue from a marginal bit no longer covers its costs (Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1981); Grossman and Stiglitz (1980); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Different kinds of 
information have different costs, yield different likely arbitrage revenues, and therefore 
provide different opportunities for private sector  information  intermediaries.  
Governments provide much macroeconomic information, though financial analysts 
provide economy-level forecasts for fees.  Governments also provide some industry 
information, but leave analysts more substantial roles here.  Securities regulations make 
firms disclose standardized firm-specific information, but distilling this into fundamental 
valuation estimates requires resources and expertise.  Thus, financial analysts’ firm-
specific forecasts are their most important contribution to asset pricing (Brown et. al   4 
(1987); Bhushan (1989)) by privately informed arbitrageurs (Roll (1988)). 
  Veldkamp  (2006a) insightfully models intermediaries specializing in the 
provision of information to arbitrageurs in the context of a market for information. All 
else equal, arbitrageurs pay more for information about a mispriced stock with a larger 
market capitalization or higher turnover, which allows  the accumulation of a larger 
position without attracting notice and moving the price. Consistent with this, we find 
more analysts following stocks that have larger market cap and are more heavily traded 
(Bhushan (1989); Alford and Berger (1999)).    
  Stocks that intermediaries find cost-ineffective to analyze have prices nonetheless. 
Such a neglected stock must be priced using such information as is available:  market and 
industry trends plus information about prominent firms with correlated fundamentals.  
For instance, Foster  (1981),  Han and Wild  (1990), and Ramnath  (2002) show that 
announcements of earnings information about some firms move the prices of other firms 
in the same industry. All else equal, information useful for valuing more stocks should 
fetch a higher price and attract greater analysts coverage (Veldkamp (2006a)). We find 
more analysts following firms whose fundamentals correlate more with those of other 
firms. We also find high profile stocks, identified by large analyst followings, commove 
more extensively with other stocks in the same industry. This information spillover effect 
is greater in industries where analysts focus on fewer stocks, and where their forecasts for 
heavily followed stocks are more convergent.  
  Additionally, we show that revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts for heavily 
followed firms cause changes in the prices of less followed firms’ shares; but revisions in 
sparsely followed firms’ earnings forecasts do not affect the prices of heavily followed   5 
stocks.  This is consistent with investors using information about prominent stocks to 
value neglected stocks, but not vice versa. That is, information spillover appears to be 
unidirectional – from heavily followed to sparsely follows stocks.   
   Our results validate modeling information intermediaries as important players in 
information generation and capitalization, as in Veldkamp  (2005, 2006a, 2006b).  In 
addition, our findings justify the industry practice of using “bellwether” stocks as 
barometers of sector trends –  as when analysts use, for example, Wal-Mart’s latest 
quarterly results to infer the fate of retailing in general.  
  Finally, our findings reconcile a seeming discord between recent work linking 
elevated firm-specific returns variation to more accurate pricing (Morck et al. (2000); 
Campbell et al. (2001); Durnev et al. (2004); Jin and Myers (2006); and others), showing 
stocks followed by many analysts to be priced more accurately (Brennan et al. (1993); 
Walther (1997)) and to commove more with the market (Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); 
Chan and Hameed (2006)). These findings are reconciled in that more widely followed 
stocks exhibit more comovement  because they are priced more accurately, and are 
therefore used to infer values for more opaque stocks.  Thus, a generally higher firm-
specific variation across all or most stocks in a market or sector can signify more accurate 
pricing, but the individual stocks that exhibit the most comovement need not be those that 
are priced least accurately.  This reasoning suggests that Merton’s (1987) model might be 
usefully  supplemented by considering information spillovers, where investors use 
information about one stock to price another that is likely affected by similar 
fundamentals.   
  The next section describes our data and variables, and section 3 reports our main   6 
empirical results  on the relation between analysts following and return comovement, 
while section 4 provides specific tests on the causal relation between the two. Finally, 
section 5 concludes.     
 
2.   Data, construction of variables, and sample 
Examination of the empirical propositions  in our paper  involves explaining a firm’s 
analyst following and also its contribution to stock return comovement using firm 
characteristics.  In this section, we describe our data sources, variables, and sample.   
 
2.1   Data sources 
Daily stock price and return data for all common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The 
sample stocks are restricted to ordinary common stocks with share code 10 and 11 for the 
period January 1984 to December 2007. ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, companies 
incorporated outside U.S., Americus Trust components, close-ended funds, preferred 
stocks, and REITs are excluded.  
The stock return data from CRSP is merged with  data from two additional 
sources. The first data source is COMPUSTAT, which is used to collect quarterly 
earnings data. For each firm in our sample, we compute the return on asset (ROA) for 
each quarter as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary item (data item 8) to total assets 
(data item 44). The second database is I/B/E/S which provides information on analyst 
coverage for each firm and the analysts’ earnings forecasts and revisions in forecasts. The 
number of analysts making one-year ahead earnings forecasts for each firm k during the   7 
year t is used to measure analyst coverage (ANALYSTk,t).   
 
2.2   Variables 
Marginal contribution to returns comovement (LPCORR) 
The central variable in our empirical investigation measures the contribution of an 
individual firm’s return to stock return comovement. We do this by estimating partial 
correlations for every stock with every other stock in its industry, and then averaging 
these to gauge each stock’s contribution to the overall comovement of stocks in its 
industry.  The construction of this variable has three steps: 
  The first step in assessing firm k’s contribution to comovement in its industry I is 
to run two-factor OLS market model regressions for all other stocks in the industry 
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each year for every other firm i in industry I, with riw firm i‘s total stock return in week w 
and with 
k
Mw r  and 
k
Iw r  contemporaneous weekly value-weighted total market and industry 
returns, respectively, both recalculated to exclude both i and k.  Our market return is a 
modified value-weighted CRSP market index, and our industry return is a value-weighted 
index of all industry I stocks, save i and k.  We assign each firm to its primary five-digit 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code.  Our sample spans  69  such 
industries.  
  The R
2 of [1], denoted  ,
2
. , k excl i R  is the  fraction of variation in firm i’s  returns   8 
explained by market and industry factors, excluding firm k. Defining NI as the number of 
firms in industry I in the year in question, this first step thus generates an  ,
2
. , k excl i R  from 
each of NI – 1 regressions of the form [1], one for every other firm i ≠ k in industry I.   
  Our second step is to rerun [1], but with the previously excluded firm k’s total 
return, rkw, as a third factor.  That is, for every firm i ≠ k in industry I, we run 
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This procedure generates a second set of NI – 1 regression R
2s, which we denote 
2
. , k incl i R .  
The extent to which the R
2 of [2] exceeds the R
2 of [1] for a given pair of stocks (k, i) 
gauges the extent to which firm k  makes a marginal contribution to firm i’s returns 
variation.   
  For each pair of firms (k, i) in the same industry I, we thus calculate a partial 
correlation coefficient equal to the difference between the two R
2s normalized by the 
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For each firm k in industry I, the regressions in equation [1] and [2] produce NI minus one 
partial correlation coefficients, defined in [3]. Intuitively, a larger PCORRk,i means firm 
k’s returns have larger correlation with firm  i‘s returns, after purging  market and 
industry-related comovement.        9 
  Our third step takes us to an estimate of each firm k’s overall contribution to the 
comovement of other stocks in its industry each year.  We  average PCORRk,i across all 
















PCORRk is bounded between zero and one, we apply a logistic transformation to obtain 
our operational measure of each firm k’s marginal contribution to comovement in its 
industry,   
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Repeating these three steps for every stock k every year generates a panel of 
LPCORRk based on weekly returns that year.  Intuitively, a higher value of LPCORRk  
means that firm k’s returns add more to the common variation in returns across firms in 
its industry.  
In addition to explaining the role of financial analysts on return comovement, we 
are also interested in the factors that may influence a firm’s attractiveness to analysts, 
such as the degree of fundamental correlations in asset returns, firm size, the amount of 
trading activity and the level of concentration of the firm’s business within the industry. 
These variables are described next.  
 
Contribution to fundamental comovement (LPCORR_ROA) 
Stock returns intrinsically co-move because of commonalities in the variation of 
fundamentals.  At the same time, more analysts are expected to follow firms whose   10 
fundamentals are more correlated with other firms’ fundamentals (Veldkamp (2006a)). 
Hence, in tracking the impact of analyst following on stock return comovement, we need 
to control for the correlations in fundamentals returns. Changes in firm-specific 
fundamental values are typically inferred from accounting measures such as return on 
assets (ROA) or return on sales (ROS) (Morck et al. (2000); Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004); Durnev et al. (2004); Wei and Zhang (2006); Chun et al. (2008)).  While ROA is 
based on historical data, stock returns also incorporate changes in expected future cash 
flows and shifts in investors’ risk preferences.  Nevertheless, we expect a firm’s level of 
analyst coverage and its contribution to return comovement to be related to the 
correlation in its ROA to that of other firms.  
As with our construction of PCORR based on stock returns, we construct the 
partial correlation of the return on assets (ROA) of firm k with the ROA of other firms in 
the industry for each year. We begin by estimating the linear regression equations similar 






Mq i i iq e ROA c ROA b a ROA + + + = ,           
  




Mq i i iq e ROA d ROA c ROA b a ROA + + + + = ,         
 
where ROAiq and  ROAkq are the return on assets in quarter q for firms i and k, and both 
firms  i  and  k  belong to the same industry. 
k
Mq ROA and 
k
Iq ROA are the value-weighted 
return on assets in quarter q for the market and industry portfolios respectively, where 
both firms  k  and  i  are  excluded from these portfolios.  Denoting the R-square from   11 
equations [5] and [6] as 
2
. , , k excl i ROA R  and 
2
. , , , k incl i ROA R  respectively, the partial correlation 
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Averaging the partial correlation estimates for firm k with all other firms in the same 
industry and taking a logistic transformation gives us LPCORR_ROAk. A high value of 
LPCORR_ROAk  suggests that firm k’s  ROA  contributes much in explaining the 
fundamental variation in asset returns of all other firms in the industry, after controlling 
for market and industry effects.  
 
Other firm-level variables  
In empirically investigating the informational role of analysts, we must incorporate 
various firm characteristics shown to be important in prior work on information markets 
(e.g. Veldkamp (2006a)) and analyst followings (e.g. Bhushan 1989; Piotroski  and 
Roulstone (2004); Chan and Hameed (2006); Frankel et al. (2006)).       
All else equal, more analysts should follow larger firms.  This might be because 
larger feasible arbitrage plays on such firms make information about their mispricing 
more valuable (Veldkamp (2006a)), or because more media coverage stimulates demand 
for analyst services (Lang and Lundholm (1996); Frankel et al. (2006)).   We use the 
beginning of year t market value of each firm k to measure the size of firm k, denoted 
SIZEk,t. We expect the variable to explain both a firm’s analyst following and its impact   12 
on return comovement. 
  More analysts should follow more heavily traded stocks, all else equal. This could 
be because higher turnover permits less conspicuous, and therefore more profitable 
arbitrage plays; or because higher turnover generates more commissions for brokerage 
firms, and thus more demand for forecasts (Brennan and Hughes (1991); Alford and 
Berger (1999)). We define TURNOVERk,t as the average daily share turnover of stock k in 
the previous year t-1.  
  More analysts might also follow less diversified firms, all else equal. This might 
be because a more focused firm has a higher partial correlation in fundamentals with 
other firms in its primary industry, and is thus a better potential bellwether stock; or 
because a more focused firm is simpler to value (Bhushan (1989)). For each firm k, we 
use the Herfindahl index of sales for the fiscal year ending in year t across business 
segments indicated by 2-digit SIC code to measure the level of concentration of its 
business and denote this as HERF_SALESk,t.   
  Finally, information about more volatile stocks might fetch higher prices 
(Bhushan (1989)), perhaps because more volatility corresponds to more “eventful” stocks 
whose fundamentals are changing faster (Morck et al. (2000)).  Hence, demand for 
analyst services might be  higher  for  stocks  whose  returns have higher standard 
deviations. We measure  t k STDRET , as the standard deviation of stock k’s weekly returns 
over the prior year t-1.  
 
2.3  Final sample  
We combine the securities from CRSP and COMPUSTAT that meet the following   13 
selection criteria. For CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ securities, we apply two 
filters: (a) there are at least 40 weekly non-missing observations, the minimum number of 
observations to estimate the market model regressions in equations [1] and [2]; and (b) 
the average daily stock price in the December of previous year is above $5 to minimize 
market frictions associated with low price stocks, such as price discreteness and bid-ask 
effects. Since we perform yearly analysis of data, we require that each firm has valid 
market capitalization value at the beginning of each year. Common stocks from 
COMPUSTAT are required to have at least 12 valid quarterly data during the past five-
year moving window to estimate LPCORR_ROAk  each year. We merge the stock 
information in CRSP-COMPUSTAT with analyst coverage information in I/B/E/S.   
The number of securities in each database and the merged sample is reported in 
Table 1. There is an increasing trend in the number of firms each year. We start with 
2220 firms in the CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S merged sample in 1984, which 
grows steadily to the peak at 3998 firms in 1997. The difference between number of firms 
in our final merged sample and the CRSP and COMPUSTAT combined sample reflects 
the number of firms without corresponding analyst coverage information in I/B/E/S. We 
perform our tests on both samples, treating firms that appear in CRSP-COMPUSTAT but 
not in I/B/E/S as firms with zero analyst coverage during the year. On average, there are 
725 firms per year (or about 20 percent of the firms in our CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged 
sample) with zero analyst following during the sample period.  
    14 
3.   Empirical results 
3.1    Summary statistics and preliminary results 
Panel A in Table 2 reports simple descriptive statistics of key variables. The pooled 
average value of the marginal contribution of a single stock to comovement in returns, 
PCORRk, is 2.6 percent, and its median is 2.4 percent.
1
Next, we sort stocks with analyst coverage into three groups based on the number 
of analysts covering the stock each year.  Firms with no analyst coverage form a separate 
group. The averages of the variables in each sub-group are presented in Panel B. The 
lowest coverage tertile  has an average of 2.6  analysts following each firm,  and  the 
coverage increases to 18.5 analysts for the highest coverage tertile. Most interestingly, 
the partial correlations of stock returns, PCORR, are monotonically increasing in analyst 
coverage. The PCORR of 2.7 percent for firms with high analyst coverage is significantly 
higher than the 2.5 (2.4) percent for firms with low (zero) coverage.   
 The partial correlation measure 
for fundamental returns, PCORR_ROAk, shows larger cross-sectional variation and a 
higher mean value of 10.9 percent, indicating a higher marginal value of ROA of a given 
firm in explaining the comovement in ROA among firms in the industry.  Substantial 
variation in firm size and turnover variables is also evident. The sales concentration 
variable shows at least half of all firms operating in a single segment, consistent with 
previous findings by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and others.  
Panels B of Table 2 show more analysts following larger cap and more heavily 
traded stocks, and the stocks of less focused firms. Panel C shows that larger firms are 
                                                 
1 Roll (1988), Morck et al. (2000) and others use [1] to estimate mean R
2s for groups of firms.  Consistent 
with these earlier results, our firm-level regressions of weekly returns on market and industry indexes 
excluding the firm itself yield a mean R
2 of 20 percent. Adding the excluded firm as in [2] raises the R-
square to 22 percent. Since the current exercise does not use these variables, they are not in the tables.      15 
more diversified, so the effects in Panel B are clearly not independent.   
Finally, Table 2 presents rather mixed evidence linking analyst coverage with the 
partial correlations in fundamentals, PCORR_ROA. Firms with low or medium analyst 
coverage have ROAs with higher partial correlations to other firms’ ROAs than do firms 
with zero coverage. However, this is not true of firms with high analyst coverage. 
However, Panel C again shows significant correlations of PCORR_ROA with other firm 
characteristics. We therefore turn to multivariate analyses. 
 
3.2   Multivariate regressions of analyst coverage   
Given the work cited above, we specify the determinants of analyst following for each 
firm k in year t as follows:  
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Supplementing the firm specific variables, we include industry and year fixed effects, 
INDDUM and YEARDUM. We estimate equation [8] as a pooled regression over the full 
sample period of 1984 to 2007 and four six-year sub-periods, 1984 to 1989, 1990 to1995, 
1996 to 2001 and 2002 to 2007. All t-statistics reported henceforth are therefore based on 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors with clustering by industry (Petersen 
(2007)).   
  Table 3 shows significantly more analysts following firms that are larger (SIZE), 
more heavily traded (TURNOVER), more eventful (STDRET) and more focused on their   16 
core businesses (HERF_SALES). But LPCORR_ROAk,t also attracts a positive coefficient 
in all sub-periods, and attains statistical significance in three of the four sub-periods.  
These findings are highly robust, in that various alternative  approaches yield 
qualitatively similar results. By this we mean identical patterns of signs and significance, 
as well as roughly concordant point estimate magnitudes. Winsorizing the key variables 
(LPCORR_ROA, TURNOVER, and STDRET )  at the 1 and 99 percentile within each year 
generates similar results, suggesting that our results are not due to extreme observations. 
The results also hold if we control for other firm-specific variables that may be correlated 
with the analyst coverage, such as the fraction of institutional ownership (Bhushan 
(1989); Rock et al. (2000)), or book-to-market ratio and the past one-year stock return 
which may proxy for glamour stocks (Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). Using Tobit regression 
model to deal with truncation of the dependent variable (ANALYST) at zero does not 
change the results qualitatively.  
Using  alternative  measures of fundamental correlations  yields  qualitatively 
similar results. Measuring the partial correlation in ROA as the R
2 of [2] minus that of [1] 
without normalizing as in [3] yields qualitatively similar results. Qualitatively similar 
results are obtained if we use quarterly returns on sales to construct LPCORR_ROSk,t to 
replace  LPCORR_ROAk,t  as an alternative gauge of each firm’s contribution to other 
firms’ fundamentals.  Including both LPCORR_ROSk,t and LPCORR_ROAk,t throughout 
also yields qualitatively similar results.  We  estimate  LPCORR_ROAk,t  by  defining 
industries differently throughout according to the 17-industry classification in Fama and 
French (1997), and obtain similar results except that the coefficient on LPCORR_ROAk,t 
is insignificant in the first two sub-periods, 1984 to 1989, and 1990 to 1995.  Finally, the   17 
number of analysts also attracts a positive coefficient in year-by-year  cross-sectional 
regressions  for every year  from 1984 to 2007 except 1991 and 1993, and attains 
significance in 12 out of the 24 years with standard errors clustered by industry. The 
mean of these coefficients is also significant using the Newy-West HAC standard error to 
account for the autocorrelation in estimated yearly coefficients. 
  These findings are consistent with significantly more analysts following firms 
whose fundamentals are more useful in predicting the fundamentals of other firms in their 
industries. 
   
3.3    Stock return comovement and analyst following   
If information about more prominent stocks is used to price less prominent stocks, stock 
price fluctuations in the former should correlate more strongly with other stocks’ price 
fluctuations, all else equal. To explore this, we run panel regressions of the form: 
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As explained  above, the dependent variable LPCORRk,t  is  the  marginal 
contribution of stock k’s return to the returns of other stocks in its industry. Table 4 
reveals a significantly larger such contribution by stocks whose fundamentals contribute 
more to those of other stocks  (LPCORR_ROA); as well as for stocks that are larger 
(SIZE), more eventful (STDRET), more heavily-traded (TURNOVER), and more focused   18 
(HERF_SALES). These variables attract statistically significant coefficients over the full 
sample period and all sub-periods except the late 1980s and early 2000s,  when 
eventfulness is insignificant, and the early 1990s, when the fundamentals correlation and 
trading activity variables are insignificant.    
Of primary interest to the issue at hand, a stock whose returns have larger 
marginal contributions to the returns of other stocks in its industry attracts a significantly 
larger following of analysts, all else equal.  This holds across the whole sample period 
and all sub-periods, after multiple controls are included.  
These findings are highly robust, and survive the same battery of robustness 
checks as above.  The sole exception is when we define industries using the 17 industry 
classification of Fama and French (1997), and estimate LPCORRk,t and LPCORR_ROAk,t 
accordingly. The coefficient on Ln(1+ANALYSTk,t)  is  marginally significant (at 10% 
level) for the whole sample period, and is significant in all sub-periods except 1984 to 
1989. Finally, year-by-year cross-sectional regressions yield positive coefficients on the 
number of analysts every year except 1988, and these coefficients are significant in 17 of 
the 24 years (using tests for significance which are clustered by industry). The mean of 
these coefficients is also significant using the Newey-West HAC standard error to 
account for the autocorrelation in estimated yearly coefficients. 
These results are consistent with price fluctuations in more prominent stocks, 
identified as those followed by more analysts, having disproportionate echoes in the price 
fluctuations of other stocks.  
   19 
3.4.    Return comovement and analyst concentration 
More analysts cover more firms in some industries than others. An industry where 
analysts follow a larger set of prominent stocks is more likely to generate mixed 
messages to investors trying to price neglected stocks, and thus should exhibit less 
information spillover from prominent to neglected stocks (Veldkamp (2006a)).  To 
explore this, we turn to our measure of the concentration of analyst coverage within an 
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where ANALYSTk,t is the number of analysts following firm k in year t and NI is the 
number of firms in industry I.  
  In one extreme industry, where all analysts follow one  and the same firm, 
HERF_ANALYSTI equals one. At the other extreme, where an equal number of analysts 
follow every firm in the industry, HERF_ANALYSTI equals 1/NI. The variable thus falls 
within the semi-open interval (0, 1], with higher values indicating analysts focusing more 
intensely on fewer stocks.   
  To explore this, we include an interaction of HERF_ANALYSTI,t  with the number 
of analysts as an additional variable, and rerun the regressions [9].  These now have the 
form: 




1 , ,2 ,









kt kt kt kt
I It y y kt
Iy
LPCORR a a ANALYST
b ANALYST HERF ANALYST a LPCORR ROA
a SIZE a TURNOVER a HERF SALE a STDRET









Table 5 shows that analysts concentrating on fewer stocks significantly magnifies 
the importance of more prominent stocks in the pricing of other stocks.  The coefficient 
on the interaction of ANALYST and HERF_ANALYST is highly significant across the full 
sample period and all the sub-sample periods except 2002-2007.  
These findings also pass the battery of robustness checks used above. The sole 
exception is when we define industries differently using the 17 industry classification of 
Fama and French (1997), and estimate LPCORRk,t and LPCORR_ROAk,t accordingly. 
Though the coefficient on ANALYST remains strongly significant in the full sample and 
all sub-periods, the coefficient on the interaction of ANALYST  and  HERF_ANALYST 
becomes  insignificant  in  the  1990 to 1995 and 2002 to 2007 sub-periods. Finally, 
estimating [11] with year-by-year cross-sectional regressions yields positive coefficient 
for interaction each year, except for 2003 and 2007, and these coefficients are significant 
in 11 out of 24 years. Their average is also significant using the Newy-West HAC 
standard error to account for the autocorrelation in estimated yearly coefficients. 
These results are consistent with analysts spreading their attention across more 
stocks in an industry damping  information spillover to neglected stocks, validating 
information spillover models of the sort developed by Veldkamp (2006a).  
    21 
4   Causality   
Tables 3 through 5 demonstrate correlations, but are silent as to what causes what. An 
absence of defensible instruments precludes instrumental variables regressions. However, 
we can use stock price reactions to revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts (Griffin 
(1976);  Givoly  and  Lakonishok  (1979))  to test causality directly. If investors use 
information about prominent stocks to price neglected ones, earnings forecast revisions 
for highly-followed stocks should affect neglected stocks’ prices; but earnings forecast 
revisions for less followed stocks should be less important in pricing highly-followed 
stocks.   
 
4.1 Event studies using portfolio-mean forecast revisions 
Our first test of this hypothesis uses aggregate forecast revisions at the portfolio level. 
We construct a firm-month panel of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions by calculating 
changes in mean one-year forward annual EPS forecasts in I/B/E/S for each firm each 
month, normalizing each observation by the previous month’s closing stock price and 
winsorizing the resulting data at 1% to limit outlier influence. Each year we sort the firms 
in each of our 69 industries by analyst coverage. Firms whose earnings are forecast by no 
analysts we call no coverage stocks.  All others are then sorted into tertiles of high, 
medium, and low coverage stocks. Each month t, the revisions in earnings forecasts are 
aggregated across each tertile within each industry to obtain FRJ,t, the value-weighted 
mean revisions in consensus earnings forecasts across all firms in tertile J, with J = 1 
(low), 2(medium), or 3(high). FRJ thus measures information produced by analysts at a 
portfolio level.      22 
Our tests regress, rk,t, the return in month t for firm k, on contemporaneous mean 
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Regression  [12] controls  for  market-wide fluctuations with rm,t, the return on 
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio; and for various firm-specific characteristics. 
These include the stock’s own return the previous month (rk,t-1) and over the six months 
prior to that (t-2 to t-7) to remove time series predictability (Jegadeesh (1990); Jegadeesh 
and  Titman  (1993)).  We also control for firm size, ln(SIZE); book-to-market ratios, 
ln(BM); and monthly trading volume over shares outstanding, TURNOVER. Changes in 
analysts’ forecast of firm k’s earnings obviously can affect firm k’s returns, and so we 
also include FRk,t in [12].  The coefficients c1, c2 and c3 thus measure abnormal returns in 
stock k associated with mean earnings forecast revisions for portfolios of low, medium, 
and high coverage stocks in the same industry after removing market-related fluctuations, 
price changes due to revisions in stock k’s own earnings forecasts in that month, and 
effects associated with the other control variables.    
Table 6 displays the results.  First, the table replicates the standard finding in the 
literature: revisions to a firm’s own earnings forecast have a strong contemporaneous 
price effect. But to the issue at hand, revisions in the mean forecast earnings of the 
                                                 
2 Since I/B/E/S reports the consensus earnings forecasts in the middle of each month, we measure the 
monthly stock return from mid-month to correspond with the period of change in earnings forecast.  
Measuring monthly returns and other monthly variables from the beginning to the end of the month gives 
similar results.    23 
portfolios of other firms in their industries also affect firms’ stock prices.  
This effect is strikingly asymmetric.  The first column, using all firms, shows that 
mean forecast revisions for high coverage firms most strongly affect other stocks in their 
industries; revisions for medium coverage firms exert a lesser, but still significant effect 
on other stocks; and revisions for low coverage stocks have even smaller effect on their 
industry peers’ stock prices. However, high coverage  firms’ contribution to industry 
comovement is not significantly greater than that of medium coverage firms (t = 1.47), 
and the latter’s contribution is insignificantly different from that of low coverage firms (t 
= 1.47).  High coverage  firms revisions do, however,  have a significantly greater 
contribution to comovement than low coverage firms revisions (t = 4.05).    
The middle three columns rerun the regression on the tertiles of covered firms 
with high, medium, and low analyst followings; and the final column uses only firms 
followed by no analysts. This sample partition reveals the same asymmetry:  Earnings 
forecast revisions for high coverage  firms significantly affect the stocks of all four 
subsamples.  Revisions for medium coverage firms affect the stock prices of only low-
coverage and no coverage firms, with a larger effect on the latter’s prices.   
Moreover, the high followings tertile revisions’ effect is significantly larger than 
that of medium coverage firms in the high (t = 2.01) and medium (t = 3.21) coverage 
subsample regressions; but the two are insignificantly (t = 1.46) different in the low 
coverage subsample regression. The revisions of medium and low coverage tertiles have 
insignificantly different effects in all three subsamples.  However, revisions of high 
coverage firms have significantly larger effects than those of the low coverage firms 
across the board (t = 3.02, 4.09, and 3.91) for the high, medium and low coverage   24 
subsamples, respectively.   
The major discrepancy in this asymmetric pattern is in the final column, which 
runs the regression on the subsample of firms followed by no analysts at all. While 
forecast revisions for all three tertiles of followed firms affect unfollowed firms’ prices, 
the asymmetry in the other four regressions is not preserved. Medium coverage tertile 
revisions affect unfollowed stock prices significantly more than either low-coverage  (t = 
4.41) or high-coverage tertile revisions (t = 2.38).      
This last finding raises the possibility that information spillover to very neglected 
firms might come primarily from somewhat prominent firms, rather than from an 
industry’s most intensely followed firms.   
The pattern in Table 6 is economically significant.  When analysts raise their EPS 
forecasts for the most highly followed tertile by one percent of their stock prices, on 
average, stocks with low, medium, and high analyst followings post monthly abnormal 
returns of 1.5%, 1.3% and 0.8% percent, respectively. These price changes are 
economically significant, in that they are comparable in magnitude to price effects of own 
firm forecast revisions (see Stickle (1991) and Gleason and Lee (2003)).   
   The results in Table 6 are also quite robust. The findings hold in all six-year 
subperiods except 1990 to 1995, in which there is only a marginally significant (at 10 
percent level) effect of the revisions in the earnings forecasts for high coverage firms on 
the returns of less prominent firms. Our results are also qualitatively unchanged if we 
drop all the control variables or add additional control variables such as the fraction of 
shares outstanding held by institutional investors, and the size, book-to-market and 
momentum factors . Also, including forecast revisions for the previous and next months   25 
yields similarly strong price effect of earnings forecast revisions of high coverage firms. 
Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we replace individual firms’ returns with the 
returns on tertile portfolios, sorted on analyst coverage, as the dependent variable. 
Qualitatively similar results likewise ensue if we sort firms into quintiles based on analyst 
followings. The earnings forecast revisions in highest coverage firms have the strongest 
effect on the stock returns across the board except in the regression of zero coverage 
firms.    
However, the asymmetry in the price effects of earnings forecast revisions 
changes when we define  industries differently throughout, using the 17 industries 
classification of Fama and French (1997) and classify firms based on analyst coverage 
accordingly. The price effect of earnings forecast revisions in highest coverage firms is 
still significant and stronger than that of earnings forecast revisions in lowest coverage 
firms across the board except in the regression of zero coverage firms. But the earnings 
forecast revisions of medium coverage firms turn out to have the strongest price effect. 
By defining industries more broadly from 69 industries to 17 industries, those prominent 
firms in the original 69 industries are likely to be classified as medium analyst firms in 
the broader 17 industries, which should explain the swing in the asymmetry between 
price effects of earnings forecast revisions in high versus medium analyst firms.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with revisions in prominent firms’ earnings 
forecasts spilling over to affect neglected stocks’ prices.  
The converse – that changes in neglected firms’ prices affect analysts earnings 
forecasts for prominent firms, even after controlling for the latter’ own price changes, 
seems  to us decidedly implausible. Reverse causality, though unlikely, is not   26 
inconceivable:  perhaps highly focused analysts are caught off guard by events that 
primarily affect neglected firms, and then revise their forecasts for prominent firms’ 
earnings. To preclude this, we modify our event study in various ways.   
 
4.2 Fuzzy signals 
If information about prominent stocks sets neglected stocks’ prices, more ambiguous 
signals about the former ought to have weaker effects on the latter, all else equal.  This 
suggests a more nuanced way of testing for information spillover if we can measure 
information ambiguity. We therefore gauge the ambiguity of the information about high 
coverage firms’ fundamentals by the standard deviation of the mean of analysts’ forecast 
revisions for high coverage firms in each industry each month, and denote this DISP3,t.  
  Table 7 thus reruns the regressions in Table 6, but including as an additional 
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 The main result from Table 6 is preserved: revisions of high coverage firms’ forecast 
earnings again have more impact than revisions of less followed firms’ forecast earnings 
on other stocks in their industry.    
  The significant negative coefficient on our signal fuzziness measure indicates that 
more conflicting information about the fundamentals of different prominent firms in an 
industry lessens the information spillover from prominent to neglected firms. Moreover,   27 
signal fuzziness curtails information spillover more strongly for low coverage than high 
coverage firms. 
  These results also survive the battery of robustness checks applied to Table 6.  
The only exceptions are that our signal fuzziness measure becomes insignificant in the 
regressions of low and zero coverage firms when we use the returns on analyst tertile 
portfolios as the dependent variable, and in the regressions of low and medium coverage 
firms when we define industries using the 17 industries classification of Fama and French 
(1997). In yet another robustness check, we also include interaction terms of forecast 
revisions with dispersion for low and medium analyst firms. Qualitatively similar results 
ensue. 
  Overall, these findings are consistent with less ambiguous revisions in prominent 
firms’ earnings forecasts affecting neglected stocks’ prices more strongly. Reverse 
causality here would require analysts to revise prominent firm's earning forecasts more 
homogeneously when caught off guard by more important events that primarily affect 
neglected stocks. While this is not impossible, we know of no theoretical or empirical 
work giving credence to such a scenario.   
 
4.3 Event studies using bellwether stocks     
So far, we define prominent firms as those in the highest tertile, ranked by the number of 
analysts following them. This portfolio approach to distinguishing prominent from 
neglected stocks means we have no precise event dates, and cannot perform precisely 
timed daily frequency event studies, which can more reliably preclude reverse causality.   
  We therefore turn to an alternative, deliberately narrow, definition of prominence.    28 
We define each industry’s bellwether firm as that followed by the most analysts, within 
each industry.  In a similar vein, the non-bellwether firm refers to the firm with highest 
coverage among the firms in the lowest analyst coverage tertile.
3
 
 In case of a tie, we 
choose the largest firm by market capitalization. To be sure this alternative definition 
yields similar results to those shown above, we replace portfolio level mean forecast 
revisions in [12]  with monthly revisions in earnings forecast of the bellwether firm, 
FRBW,t, and the non-bellwether firm, FRNBW,t: 
[14]  
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Panel A of Table 8 shows revisions to bellwether firms earnings forecasts 
affecting the returns on all other firms in the industry. The effect illustrates the same 
asymmetry evident above: it is largest for low coverage  firms,  and  smaller,  but 
significant,  for medium coverage  firms, and insignificant for high coverage  firms 
(excluding the bellwether firm, of course).  Firms not covered by any analyst exhibit a 
significant price effect in reaction to the forecast revision of the bellwether firm but to a 
lesser extent than the low coverage firms. The revisions in earnings forecasts of the non-
bellwether firms, on the other hand, do not have a similar price effect on other firms. The 
revisions in earnings forecasts of the non-bellwether firms have a significantly smaller 
price impact on other peer firms with low and medium coverage. The returns on 
uncovered firms appear to react to revisions in earnings forecasts of both the bellwether 
                                                 
3 An alternative definition of the non-bellwether firm as the firm with the lowest analyst coverage yields 
very few forecast revisions each year, although the results are qualitatively similar.    29 
and non-bellwether firms, suggesting a more general spillover of information to these 
firms. These results confirm the asymmetry in price effects associated with the revisions 
in earnings forecasts of prominent firms versus relatively neglected firms.  
Panel B reruns [14] but also includes an interaction of the revision in consensus 
earnings forecast of the bellwether firm in month t, FRBW,t, with its dispersion in earnings 
forecasts, DISPBW,t, as in [13]. The panel shows lower dispersion across bellwether firm's 
forecast revisions significantly magnifying information spillover into the abnormal 
returns on less prominent stocks in the same industries.  
This effect is economically significant: if forecast dispersion is near zero, 
indicating near uniformity across analysts’ forecast revisions, a one percent increase in 
forecast earnings for the bellwether firm corresponds to a 0.80 percent rise in low 
coverage firms’ prices, versus an unconditional effect of 0.57 percent in Panel A. A one 
standard deviation increase in the dispersion of analysts forecast for the bellwether firm 
damps the same mean revision’s impact on low coverage firm’s prices by about 0.05 
percent. Using firms followed by no analysts yields a significant damping effect due to 
dispersion in revisions of the bellwether firm’s earnings forecasts  that is statistically 
identical in magnitude to that for low coverage firms.   
These results also survive the battery of robustness checks applied to Table 6 with 
a few exceptions.  The price impact of FRBW,t on other peer firms reported in Panel A is 
significant in all sub-periods except for 1990-1995. When we interact the forecast 
revision with the dispersion measure, DISPBW,t, the interaction coefficients are generally 
significant, except for a couple of analyst tertiles in the sub-period 1996-2001 and when 
we reclassify the industries according to the 17-industry classification as in Fama and   30 
French (1997). Finally, defining an industry’s bellwether firms as the portfolio of largest 
three firms by analyst coverage yields qualitatively similar results.  
 We interpret these findings as consistent with information spillover from 
bellwether firms to other firms, but not in the reverse direction.  This spillover is larger 
when revisions to analysts forecasts of bellwether firms’ earnings are more similar.    
  
4.4 Event studies of bellwether stocks using daily data 
Isolating bellwether firms lets us address causality more unequivocally, since we can now 
identify precise dates upon which the bellwether firm’s forecast earnings are revised and 
then look for stock price changes in other firms on those dates. That analysts time their 
revisions of bellwether firms’ forecast earnings to fall precisely on dates when neglected 
firms prices move en masse relative to industry and market benchmarks begs credulity.   
We designate day zero as the event day on which one or more analysts announce 
revised earnings forecasts for the bellwether firm.  We then  compute a three-day 
cumulative abnormal return, CARj, for every firm j (excluding the bellwether firm) in that 
industry from the prior to the subsequent day. Following Gleason and Lee (2003), we 
measure CARj as the excess return over a contemporaneous value-weighted return of all 
other stocks in j’s size decile. An alternative measure of CARj is the excess return over 
the expected return from a four-factor model comprising the Fama-French three factors 
(i.e. excess return on the value-weighted CRSP market index over the one-month T-bill 
return; small minus big return premium (SMB) and the high book-to-market minus low 
book-to-market return premium (HML))  and the momentum factor in Carhart (1997). 
Again following previous studies, we treat CARj associated with upward and downward   31 
revisions to the bellwether firm’s forecast earnings separately.   
To mitigate bias from confounding events, we apply several filters to our event 
study. We exclude the event days when the bellwether firm earnings forecast revisions 
coincide with the same firm’s quarterly earnings announcement within a five-day 
window, i.e. days -2 to +2 around the event day.  When we compute CARj for each event 
day, we drop the  CARj  of other firms in the industry if firm j  made an earnings 
announcement or had earnings forecast revision during the five-day window around the 
event day. This leaves a set of events on which the only relevant news is most likely to be 
the bellwether firm’s earnings forecast revision announcement. To facilitate comparison 
with previous work using such data, we split these events into upward and downward 
earnings forecast revisions.   
Table 9 reports our results.  First, we reproduce the standard finding of previous 
studies:  a firm's earnings forecast revisions cause its stock price to move in the same 
direction.  The coefficients on CARBW, the three-day cumulative abnormal returns for the 
bellwether stock whose earnings are revised, are similar in magnitude to the numbers 
reported in Stickel (1991) and Gleason and Lee (2003). For example, we find an average 
3-day  CAR  for the bellwether firm of 0.31 (-0.35) percent following an upward 
(downward) revision in its own forecasted earnings. This compares with the 
corresponding average CAR of 0.7 (-1.3) percent for all firms in the sample reported in 
Gleason and Lee (2003).   
The main result in Table 9 is that the stock prices of other firms in the same 
industry also change significantly when bellwether firms’ forecast earnings are revised, 
and in the same direction as those revisions.  This effect is larger for low coverage firms   32 
than for firms in the medium coverage tertile. Firms followed by no analysts post even 
more negative significant CARs than low coverage firms upon downward revisions to 
bellwether firms’ forecast earnings.  Upon upward revisions to bellwether firms’ forecast 
earnings, stocks followed by no analysts appear to rise less than those in the low coverage 
tertile, but the two CAR estimates are statistically indistinguishable.  
These results also survive a battery of robustness checks.  Specifically, the results 
remain unchanged if we winsorize the extreme 1% of CARs across all earnings forecast 
revision events, or expand the event window from three to five days. When we sort the 
firms into quintiles (instead of tertiles) of analyst coverage within each industry, we also 
obtain comparable results. We interpret these results as consistent with earnings revisions 
for bellwether firms causing neglected firms’ prices to change.   
 
5.   Conclusions 
Firm-specific information flows more directly into the prices of some stocks than others. 
Informed investors collectively  generate greater trading revenues with private 
information about larger stocks, since larger informed trades are required to move prices. 
Since investors and arbitrageurs are willing to pay more for such information, specialized 
information intermediaries, like financial analysts, focus their efforts on such stocks 
(Bhushan (1989) and Veldkamp (2006a)). We find that indeed more analysts follow firms 
which are larger, more actively traded, and whose fundamentals correlate strongly with 
those of other firms.   
  We document that the stock returns of firms followed by many analysts contribute 
to the synchronicity of stock returns, even after controlling for fundamental correlations   33 
(see also Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed (2006)), and this effect 
attenuates where more firms are directly followed by analysts. This is consistent with 
investors using information about a firm not just to trade that firm’s stock, but also to 
value and trade other firms as well. Hence,  higher comovement associated with the 
number of analysts following a stock thus reflects rational information intermediation.  
We also find that information contained in the forecasted earnings of firms with 
intense coverage (or bellwether firms) diffuses to the prices of other firms with low or 
zero coverage, especially when there is greater certainty (lower dispersion) in the 
earnings forecasts.  The converse is not true: revisions in the earnings forecasts of low 
coverage firms do not affect the prices of bellwether firms.  
Our findings validate models casting information intermediaries in general, and 
financial analysts in particular, in key roles in financial markets. Our results also suggest 
that a degree of stock price comovement may well be consistent with rationality given 
costly information as in Veldkamp (2006a). Yet, our results also suggest that large scale 
stock price comovement indicates that many stock returns are driven not by direct firm 
specific information but by inferred industry wide information.   More importantly, this 
paper provides an empirical understanding of the transmission of information via analysts 
and trading in equity markets.  
  While a behavioral basis for comovement (Barberis et al. (2005)) or correlated 
demand shocks in Greenwood (2008) are not precluded, our findings better accord with a 
basis in costly information. However, our results are obtained in a highly developed 
capital market with strong institutions. In less developed financial markets, behavioral 
considerations might loom more important.     34 
     35 
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Table 1: Number of firms in the sample 
The sample consists of common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (CRSP dataset) over the 
period 1984 to 2007. These firms in the CRSP database are merged with those in COMPUSTAT and 
I/B/E/S. The final sample consists of firms in CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged sample in which firms not 











I/B/E/S merged sample 
1984  6,968  3,207  2,220 
1985  7,099  3,058  2,292 
1986  7,544  3,110  2,366 
1987  7,896  3,251  2,508 
1988  7,865  2,963  2,309 
1989  7,613  3,085  2,444 
1990  7,411  3,108  2,477 
1991  7,430  2,730  2,183 
1992  7,760  3,161  2,488 
1993  8,262  3,692  2,931 
1994  8,837  4,185  3,267 
1995  9,243  4,150  3,301 
1996  9,821  4,536  3,678 
1997  10,080 .  4,760  3,998 
1998  9,984  4,655  3,887 
1999  9,690  4,068  3,390 
2000  9,362  4,180  3,314 
2001  8,678  3,541  2,821 
2002  7,945  3,450  2,750 
2003  7,507  3,062  2,443 
2004  7,347  3,434  2,762 
2005  7,365  3,452  2,808 
2006  7,431  3,377  2,763 
2007  7,677  3,319  2,728 
Total number of firm-years  196,815   .  85,534 .  68,128 . 
Average number of firms per year  8,201  3,564  2,839 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
In this table, PCORRk measures the partial correlation of firm k’s returns with returns of other firms in the 
industry. Each year, for a given pair of firm k and firm i in industry I, we estimate a two-factor market 
model regression:  
kk
iw i i Mw i Iw iw r a br cr e = + ++,            
[1] 
where riw is the return on firm i in week w, and 
k
Mw r  and 
k
Iw r are the value-weighted return on the market 
and industry portfolios excluding firms i and k. We estimate a second regression model which adds rkw, 





Mw i i iw e r d r c r b a r + + + + = .           
[2] 
The r-squares from equations [1] and [2] are denoted as 
2
,. i excl k R and 
2
,. i incl k R respectively. The partial 
















] is averaged across all firms in 
the industry to produce PCORRk. A similar measure is constructed using quarterly return on assets (ROA) 
and denoted as PCORR_ROAk. ANALYSTk is the number of analysts making one-year forward earnings 
forecast for firm k each year. SIZEk is the beginning-of-year market capitalization of firm k. TURNOVERk is 
the average of daily share turnover in the previous year. HERF_SALESk is the Herfindahl index of sales 
across 2-digit business segments for the fiscal year ending in the year. STDRETk is the standard deviation of 
weekly returns in the previous year. In Panel B, we group stocks into tertiles based on the number of 
analysts following each year within each industry. Group zero refers to stocks with zero coverage while 
groups 1 to 3 have increasing coverage. The last two columns report the robust T-statistics cluster by 
industry of the tests for the null hypothesis of equality for high and low (or zero) analyst coverage groups. 
Panel C presents the average of correlation coefficients calculated every year. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the pool sample 
Variable  Mean  Std.  Q1  Median  Q3 
PCORRk (%)  2.558  0.934  2.041  2.359  2.824 
ANALYSTk  7.462  8.814  1  4  11 
PCORR_ROAk(%)  10.884  5.873  7.289  9.581  12.858 
SIZEk ($billion)  1.981  11.074  0.063  0.209  0.829 
TURNOVERk (%)  0.528  0.829  0.147  0.304  0.624 
HERF_SALESk  0.818  0.255  0.587  1  1 
STDRETk (%)  5.652  2.806  3.642  5.086  7.046 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics across analyst coverage groups 












ANALYSTk  0  2.641  7.373  18.480  NA  NA 
PCORRk (%)  2.359  2.476  2.636  2.722  8.040  6.171 
PCORR_ROAk (%)  10.720  11.013  11.119  10.669  -0.124  -1.547 
SIZEk ($billion)  0.316  0.265  0.738  6.357  7.342  7.360 
TURNOVERk (%)  0.313  0.474  0.606  0.676  7.378  5.089 
HERF_SALESk  0.827  0.848  0.829  0.768  -4.232  -5.833 
STDRETk (%)  5.306  6.077  5.890  5.240  -0.296  -7.286   42 
Panel C: Correlation coefficients 
Variable  PCORRk  ANALYSTk  PCORR_ROAk  SIZEk  TURNOVERk  HERF_SALESk  STDRETk 
PCORRk(%)  1  0.175***  0.052***  0.075***  0.079***  0.012*  0.016*** 
ANALYSTk    1  0.002  0.484***  0.177***  -0.123***  -0.093*** 
PCORR_ROAk(%)      1  -0.023***  -0.007  0.109***  -0.053*** 
SIZEk($billion)        1  -0.026***  -0.150***  -0.148*** 
TURNOVERk (%)          1  0.149***  0.443*** 
HERF_SALESk            1  0.256*** 
STDRETk(%)              1 
 *, **, and *** indicate that the average correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively based 
on time series standard deviations of the average correlation coefficients.  43 
Table 3: Determinants of analyst coverage  
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where, for each firm k and year t,  ANALYSTk,t is the number of analysts making one-year ahead earnings 
forecast; LPCORR_ROAk,t is the logit transformation of the partial correlation measure based on ROA; 
SIZEk,t  is the beginning-of-year market value; TURNOVERk,t  is the average of daily share turnover; 
HERF_SALESk,t  is the Herfindahl index of sales across 2-digit business segments;  STDRETk,t  is the 
standard deviation of weekly returns; INDDUMs are industry dummies; and YEARDUMs are year 
dummies. The robust t-statistics cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
 
  Sample Period 
Indep. Var.  1984 - 2007 1984 - 1989 1990 - 1995 1996 - 2001 2002 - 2007 
LPCORR_ROAk,t  0.048  0.025  0.027  0.054  0.055 
  3.847  1.680  1.641  2.994  2.763 
ln(SIZEk,t)  0.494  0.575  0.491  0.450  0.459 
  72.632  68.377  60.411  61.610  48.417 
TURNOVERk,t  0.114  0.620  0.356  0.134  0.070 
  5.129  9.825  11.374  6.632  3.325 
HERF_SALESk,t  0.264  0.271  0.328  0.233  0.214 
  9.300  5.714  7.811  7.257  4.011 
ln(STDRETk,t)  0.231  0.075  0.094  0.205  0.337 
  10.856  2.112  3.499  6.898  8.052 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. Rsq  0.631  0.700  0.674  0.624  0.600 
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Table 4: Return comovement and analyst coverage 
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where, for each firm k and year t, LPCORRk,t and LPCORR_ROAk,t are the logit transformation of the 
partial correlation measures based on stock returns and ROA; ANALYSTk,t is the number of analysts making 
one-year ahead earnings forecast;  SIZEk,t  is the beginning-of-year market value; TURNOVERk,t  is the 
average of daily share turnover; HERF_SALESk,t is the Herfindahl index of sales across 2-digit business 
segments; STDRETk,t is the standard deviation of weekly returns; INDDUMs are industry dummies; and 
YEARDUMs are year dummies. The robust t-statistics cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
 
  Sample Period 
Indep. Var.  1984 - 2007  1984 - 1989  1990 - 1995  1996 - 2001  2002 - 2007 
ln(1+ANALYSTk,t)  0.020  0.012  0.021  0.029  0.037 
  3.064  2.129  2.787  2.896  4.372 
LPCORR_ROAk,t  0.023  0.008  0.007  0.029  0.049 
  4.105  1.852  0.699  2.911  2.865 
ln(SIZEk,t)  0.021  0.008  0.019  0.015  0.030 
  6.799  1.898  3.850  4.469  6.556 
TURNOVERk,t  0.023  0.034  0.012  0.029  0.011 
  5.274  1.799  0.928  5.749  2.353 
HERF_SALESk,t  0.043  0.042  0.044  0.033  0.038 
  3.319  2.993  2.450  1.912  2.053 
ln(STDRETk,t)  0.025  -0.012  0.029  0.026  0.027 
  2.591  -0.848  1.954  1.953  1.614 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. Rsq  0.169  0.170  0.128  0.204  0.193 
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Table 5: Return comovement, analyst coverage and concentration   
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where, for each firm k and year t,  LPCORRk,t and LPCORR_ROAk,t are the logit transformation of the 
partial correlation measures based on stock returns and ROA; ANALYSTk,t is the number of analysts making 
one-year ahead earnings forecast; HERF_ANALYSTI,t is the Herfindhal index of analyst coverage in the 
industry;  SIZEk,t  is the beginning-of-year market value; TURNOVERk,t  is the average of daily share 
turnover; HERF_SALESk,t is the Herfindahl index of sales across 2-digit business segments; STDRETk,t is 
the standard deviation of weekly returns; INDDUMs are industry dummies; and YEARDUMs are year 
dummies. The robust t-statistics cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
 
  Sample Period 
Indep. Var.  1984 - 2007  1984 - 1989  1990 - 1995  1996 - 2001  2002 - 2007 
ln(1+ANALYSTk,t)  0.029  0.021  0.033  0.039  0.045 
  4.798  3.043  3.827  4.361  5.065 
ln(1+ANALYSTk,t)* 
HERF_ANALYSTI,t  0.403  0.296  0.449  0.565  0.312 
  3.524  1.955  2.534  2.624  1.616 
LPCORR_ROAk,t  0.023  0.007  0.018  0.033  0.036 
  4.702  2.414  2.488  3.448  3.387 
ln(SIZEk,t)  0.019  0.006  0.017  0.016  0.028 
  6.420  1.486  3.561  4.803  6.326 
TURNOVERk,t  0.023  0.028  0.013  0.029  0.012 
  5.368  1.459  1.098  5.657  2.669 
HERF_SALESk,t  0.043  0.037  0.046  0.031  0.044 
  3.427  2.876  2.666  1.903  2.472 
ln(STDRETk,t)  0.026  -0.007  0.029  0.032  0.024 
  2.713  -0.540  2.183  2.545  1.448 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. Rsq  0.180  0.186  0.120  0.212  0.206 
   46 
Table 6: Impact of earnings forecast revisions on stock returns 
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where, for each firm k in month t, Rk,t is the monthly stock return; FRk,t is the monthly revision in earnings 
forecasts for firm k; FRj,t  is the value-weighted average of revisions in earnings forecasts for firms in 
analyst coverage tertile j (within the same industry); rm,t is the monthly value-weighted return of all stocks 
in CRSP;  rk,t-2,t-7  is firm k’s cumulative return over month t-7 to month t-2; SIZEk,t  is beginning-of-month 
market value; BMk,t is book-to-market ratio; TURNROVERk,t is the average daily share turnover in the 
previous month. The equation is estimated for all firms and separately for each group of firms sorted on 
analyst coverage. The robust t-statistics cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
  Analyst Coverage Groups 









Intercept  0.673  3.451  4.157  1.659  0.465 
  1.754  7.625  7.231  3.618  0.676 
FR1(low)  0.185  -0.034  0.057  0.378  0.458 
  1.817  -0.276  0.363  3.187  3.149 
FR2(medium)  0.635  0.148  0.307  0.911  1.571 
  2.269  0.517  1.075  2.377  6.129 
FR3(high)  1.100  0.838  1.349  1.518  0.826 
  5.759  3.422  5.072  5.855  4.481 
FRk  1.637  2.091  2.042  1.244   
  13.983  5.251  13.026  17.307   
rm,t  1.024  1.135  1.122  1.011  0.749 
  14.686  17.537  14.884  15.421  9.600 
rk,t-1  -0.011  -0.022  -0.014  -0.007  0.002 
  -3.790  -5.849  -2.580  -1.757  0.351 
rk,t-2,t-7  0.000  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.005 
  0.035  -0.921  -0.587  0.182  3.450 
ln(SIZEk)  0.021  -0.170  -0.268  -0.081  0.062 
  1.208  -5.367  -5.905  -2.015  1.400 
ln(BMk,)  0.248  0.214  0.136  0.239  0.447 
  5.694  3.117  2.350  4.186  12.355 
TURNOVERk  0.044  0.086  0.068  -0.114  -0.141 
  0.924  1.392  0.864  -1.217  -1.635 
Adj. Rsq (%)  12.530  18.420  15.040  10.840  6.289   47 
 
Table 7: Impact of earnings forecast revisions and dispersion in revisions on stock 
returns 
3
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where, for each firm k in month t, Rk,t is the monthly stock return; FRk,t is the monthly revision in earnings 
forecasts for firm k; FRj,t  is the value-weighted average of revisions in earnings forecasts for firms in 
analyst coverage tertile j (within the same industry); DISP3 is the standard deviation of revision in earnings 
forecast for the highest analysts coverage tertile;  rm,t is the monthly value-weighted return of all stocks in 
CRSP;  rk,t-2,t-7  is firm k’s cumulative return over month t-7 to month t-2; SIZEk,t  is beginning-of-month 
market value; BMk,t is book-to-market ratio; TURNROVERk,t is the average daily share turnover in the 
previous month. The equation is estimated for all firms and separately for each group of firms based on 
analyst coverage. The robust t-statistics cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
 
  Analyst Coverage Groups 









Intercept  0.375  1.800  2.187  0.927  0.243 
  2.031  8.108  8.007  4.259  0.707 
FR1(low)  0.164  -0.051  0.040  0.353  0.435 
  1.613  -0.415  0.247  3.010  3.001 
FR2(medium)  0.638  0.138  0.342  0.958  1.548 
  2.673  0.530  1.417  3.136  6.343 
FR3(high)  1.893  1.507  2.290  2.606  1.533 
  6.118  4.350  5.938  6.682  7.014 
FR3*DISP3  -0.879  -0.684  -1.156  -1.245  -0.760 
  -4.108  -3.124  -3.881  -5.443  -4.399 
FRk  1.638  2.086  2.043  1.249   
  13.928  5.235  13.100  17.351   
rm,t  1.025  1.135  1.122  1.011  0.750 
  14.670  17.570  14.864  15.403  9.537 
rk,t-1  -0.011  -0.023  -0.014  -0.007  0.002 
  -3.835  -5.940  -2.552  -1.768  0.339 
rk,t-2,t-7  0.000  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.005 
  -0.067  -0.978  -0.691  0.135  3.401 
ln(SIZEk)  0.019  -0.175  -0.279  -0.093  0.062 
  1.144  -5.566  -6.308  -2.351  1.424 
ln(BMk,)  0.249  0.219  0.140  0.238  0.443 
  5.620  3.180  2.410  4.155  12.174 
TURNOVERk  0.039  0.082  0.060  -0.126  -0.147 
  0.807  1.329  0.764  -1.331  -1.660 
Adj. Rsq (%)  12.550  18.440  15.060  10.850  6.300   48 
Table 8: Impact of earnings forecast revisions of bellwether firms on stock returns 
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where, for each firm k in month t, Rk,t is the monthly stock return; FRk,t is the monthly revision in earnings 
forecasts for firm k; FRBW,t and FRNBW,t  are the revisions in earnings forecasts for the bellwether firm and 
the comparing non-bellwether firm within the same industry; rm,t is the monthly value-weighted return of 
all stocks in CRSP; rk,t-2,t-7  is firm k’s cumulative return over month t-7 to month t-2; BMk,t is book-to-
market ratio; TURNROVERk,t is the average daily share turnover in the previous month. In Panel B, we 
interact FRBW with DISPBW, the standard deviation of revision in earnings forecast for the bellwether firms:  
^
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These equations are estimated for all firms and separately for each group of firms based on analyst 
coverage (the coefficients associated with the control variables are suppressed). The robust t-statistics 
cluster by industry are provided in Italic.   
 
Panel A 












FRBW  0.318  0.098  0.403  0.569  0.283 
  2.215  0.852  2.170  4.368  2.196 
FRNBW  -0.006  -0.088  -0.017  0.057  0.093 
  -0.181  -2.198  -0.412  0.985  2.270 
FRBW - FRNBW  0.325  0.186  0.419  0.512  0.190 
  2.260  1.545  2.179  3.606  1.398 
Adj. Rsq (%)  12.450  18.120  15.040  10.720  6.164 
 
Panel B 












FRBW  0.574  0.327  0.680  0.799  0.567 
  3.555  1.973  3.218  5.105  3.371 
FRBW*DISPBW  -0.889  -0.785  -0.960  -0.823  -0.985 
  -2.456  -2.726  -2.249  -2.270  -1.999 
FRNBW  -0.010  -0.092  -0.020  0.056  0.090 
  -0.267  -2.204  -0.487  0.958  2.169 
Adj. Rsq (%)  12.470  18.130  15.050  10.730  6.182 
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Table 9: Stocks returns and earnings forecast revisions of bellwether firms: event 
study 
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of firms in the same industry in response 
to the analyst forecast revisions of bellwether firms. CAR is defined as either cumulative excess return over 
the average return corresponding to the firm’s size deciles (Size-adjusted CAR) or cumulative abnormal 
return adjusted for Fama-French 3-factor plus momentum factor (Four-factor CAR) over the 3 day window 
[-1, +1] surrounding the forecast revision. FRBW  is the magnitude of revisions in earnings forecasts for the 
bellwether firm (for each industry); CARBW, CARZERO, CARLOW, CARMED are the 3-day cumulative abnormal 
returns corresponding to the bellwether, zero coverage, low-coverage and medium-coverage firms within 
each industry respectively. CARMED-ZERO (CARMED-LOW) is the difference between CAR for medium analyst 
firms and that for zero (low) analyst firms. All variables are expressed in basis points. The average value 
across forecast revision events and the robust t-statistics (in Italic) cluster by industry are reported.  
 
 
Upward Forecast Revisions 
(Number of observations = 20751)    
Downward Forecast Revisions 










FRBW  38.397    -63.167 
       
CARBW  31.450  28.359    -34.958  -29.952 
  7.639  6.663    -10.435  -9.837 
CARZERO  6.785  5.928    -7.518  -6.637 
  2.529  2.456    -2.485  -2.227 
CARLOW  10.731  7.407    -6.252  -4.550 
  4.344  3.276    -3.230  -2.910 
CARMED  8.048  4.038    -2.284  -0.509 
  3.912  2.244    -1.258  -0.310 
CARMED - ZERO  1.263  -1.890    5.234  6.128 
  0.485  -0.717    1.763  1.980 
CARMED - LOW  -2.684  -3.370    3.967  4.041 
  -1.348  -1.589     1.866  2.028 
 
 